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PLAINTIFFS' FAULT IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES: 
WHY ARE THEY GETTING AWAY WITH IT 
IN MARYLAND? 
Gardner M. Duvallt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Assume a driver gets drunk and then wrecks his car. Assume also 
that the wreck is injurious to the driver but "fatal" to the car. Because 
the car is defective in its ability to withstand foreseeable accidents, it 
bursts into flames. The driver is killed by the fire rather than surviving 
the wreck with injuries. Family members sue the auto manufacturer. 
But for the fire caused by the defect, the driver would be alive. But for 
the driver's drinking, however, there would have been no fire. This 
scenario poses key questions. Can the driver's family recover? Does 
the driver's fault diminish the recovery? 
Affirmative defenses in Maryland products liability cases represent a 
paradox. It has been too easily assumed that the plaintiffs' fault is 
generally irrelevant. 1 Yet that assumption makes it challenging to 
fashion a place for plaintiffs' fault in strict products liability cases. 
This Article considers the possibilities of plaintiffs' fault in Maryland 
products liability law and discusses alternative approaches.2 
t Gardner Duvall is a partner in the Products Liability practice group at 
Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, LLP. He is a 1983 graduate of Tulane 
University and a 1986 graduate of the University of Maryland School of 
Law. He can be reached at gduvall@wtplaw.com. 
1. See Valk Mfg. Co. v. Rangaswamy, 74 Md. App. 304, 324, 537 A.2d 622, 634 
(1988) (finding it irrelevant that plaintiff assumed the risk or was contribu-
torily negligent); Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, 303 Md. 581, 597, 495 A.2d 
348, 356 ( 1985) (finding it irrelevant that the plaintiff wore the defective 
clothing inside-out); Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 620-26, 
440 A.2d 1085, 1089-92 (1982), affd 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983) 
(stating plaintiff's negligence was irrelevant in pool accident). But see Simp-
son v. Standard Container Co., 72 Md. App. 199, 206-07, 527 A.2d 1337, 
1341 (1987) (stating that a failure to follow directions precludes recovery 
under strict liability); Kirby v. Hylton, 51 Md. App. 365, 372-73, 443 A.2d 
640, 644-45 (1982) (finding that a child assumed the risk when playing with 
a pipe on contractor's land). 
2. See infra Parts 11-IV. 
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II. MARYLAND LAW 
A. Maryland's Adoption ofRestatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A 
Maryland long ago established contributory fault as the rule gov-
erning the effect of plaintiffs' fault in negligence. 3 Then, in 1976, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted section 402A from the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts ("Restatement (Second)"), which provides various 
defenses available to a seller in products liability actions.4 Specifically, 
the court found that comment n of section 402A allows a seller to use 
the defense of unreasonable assumption of risk when the plaintiff uses 
a product that he or she knows to possess a danger.5 
Unfortunately, the court of appeals failed to clarify the ambiguities 
that existed regarding the defenses provided in comment n. 6 For in-
stance, comment n is vague and incomplete in its assertion that the 
ordinary, contributory negligence of a consumer's mere "failure to 
discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility 
of its existence," is not a manufacturer's defense to a section 402A 
claim.7 A consumer's knowing and unreasonable assumption of the 
risk of the product defect, however, is a complete bar to a products 
liability claim. 8 Thus, comment n is problematic in that it fails to pro-
vide a rule or any guidance for situations in which a plaintiffs' fault 
3. See Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 359-60, 189 A. 260, 264 (1936) (discuss-
ing the distinction between contributory negligence and voluntary assump-
tion of risk). "Assumption of the risk and contributory negligence are 
closely related and often overlapping defenses." Schroyer v. McNeal, 323 
Md. 275, 280, 592 A.2d 1119, 1121 (1991). Assumption of the risk, as a 
defense to a negligence claim, occurs where the plaintiff voluntarily en-
counters obvious danger, with knowledge and appreciation of the risk. /d. 
at 282, 592 A.2d at 1123. Contributory negligence occurs when a person 
neglects "the duty imposed upon all to observe ordinary care for their own 
safety." Bait. Gas and Elec. Co. v. Flippo, 348 Md. 680, 703, 705 A.2d 1144, 
1155 (1998) (quoting Campfield v. Crowther, 252 Md. 88, 93, 249 A.2d 168, 
172 ( 1969)). Contributory negligence is judged by the actions which "a 
person of ordinary prudence" would do, or not do, in the circumstances. 
/d. Assumption of a risk might be unreasonable, which makes the assump-
tion negligent. In situations where assumption of the risk is reasonable, it is 
still a defense because the plaintiff cannot recover for a harm that was vol-
untarily accepted. /d. at 705, 705 A.2d at 1156 (citing Rogers v. Frush, 257 
Md. 233, 243, 262 A.2d 549, 554 (1970)). 
4. See Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 346, 363 A.2d 955, 959-60 
(1976) (stating that "[u]nder !§ 402A, various defenses are available to the 
seller in an action based on strict liability in tort"). 
5. /d. at 346, 363 A.2d at 960. 
6. /d. 
7. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 402A cmt. n (1965) [hereinafter RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND)]. Comment n does not purport to contain an exhaus-
tive list of a product user's potential fault. /d. 
8. /d. The only other form of plaintiffs' fault addressed in section 402A is 
product misuse. /d. at cmts. g, h; Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 
Md. 581, 592-97, 495 A.2d 348, 353-56 (1985). Misuse is not considered in 
this Article. 
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falls in the gray area between the two extremes of failure to notice a 
product defect and unreasonable assumption of risk.9 
Returning to the introductory hypothetical, there is nothing "unrea-
sonable" about a driver's conduct in not noticing that his car's fuel 
system is sub-standard for withstanding the force of a crash. On the 
other hand, that driver is arguably unreasonable when committing the 
crime of driving drunk. Even though the driver was drunk, he did not 
assume the risk of a defective fuel system. Because the driver had no 
knowledge that the fuel system would enhance the risk of injury after 
collision, he could not have assumed the risk. 
In 1998, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability ("Restate-
ment (Third)") clarified comment n. 10 The Restatement (Third) asserts 
that the true purpose of section 402A was threefold: (1) manufactur-
ing defects; (2) eliminating privity of contract; and (3) eliminating 
any unreasonable requirement of proving why a product was sold with 
a manufacturing defect. 11 The Restatement (Third) claims that 
"[s]ection 402A had little to say about liability for design defects or for 
products sold with inadequate warnings."12 Thus, disallowing as a de-
fense the user's failure to notice a manufacturing defect is logical, be-
cause the user has no obligation to look for a fault that he can 
reasonably expect not to exist. 13 If the user knows of the defect yet 
unreasonably continues to use the product, however, the seller should 
be absolved from liability for the risk the plaintiff knowingly 
assumes. 14 
Furthermore, comment n to section 402A illustrates the American 
Law Institute's (ALI) resistance to adopting a contributory negligence 
standard, which was the rule of the majority of American states in the 
mid-1960s when the ReStatement (Second) was published. 15 Essentially, 
comment n "altered the general tort defenses by narrowing the appli-
cability of contributory negligence and emphasizing assumption of 
risk as the primary defense."16 This alteration consequently elimi-
9. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. n . 
. 10. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PRODS. LIAB. (1998) [hereinafter REsTATE-
MENT (THIRD)). 
11. See id. at Introduction, p. 3. 
12. !d.; see also id. § 1 cmt. a ("[I]t soon became evident that§ 402A, created to 
deal with liability for manufacturing defects, could not appropriately be ap-
plied to cases of design defects or defects based on inadequate instructions 
or warnings."); Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1165-66 (Cal. 
1978). . 
13. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 17 cmt. d. 
14. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. n. 
15. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 17 cmt. a (noting that because section 402A was 
largely an effort to create law rather than restate the law, the drafters did 
not bind themselves to the historical rule of contributory negligence for 
products liability). 
16. !d. (noting that the application of the rule of contributory negligence was 
narrowed, not expressly eliminated). Comment n of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts ("Restatement (Second)") provides, "[c]ontributory negligence 
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nated all defenses requiring the user to search for manufacturing de-
fects, as such a requirement would go beyond exactly the type of 
liability that section 402A was trying to avoid. 17 
When Maryland adopted section 402A and repeatedly thereafter, 
the court of appeals emphasized that products liability actions are 
fault-based, as opposed to true strict liability cases.18 The Restatement 
(Second) requires only proof of the sale of a defective and unreasona-
bly dangerous product, not proof of the reason why the product was 
defective. 19 
B. Maryland Cases 
The drafters of section 402A were focused on manufacturing de-
fects, privity, and unrealistic burdens of proof.20 Because of these 
concerns and the drafters' dislike of the contributory negligence rule, 
comment n to section 402A deals with affirmative defenses in a single 
paragraph that limits the application of the contributory negligence 
defense.21 
The limited products liability experience of the drafters in framing 
section 402A has infected the Maryland decisions. A review of the Ma-
ryland cases considering plaintiffs' fault in a products liability setting 
shows the way into this muddle. Without addressing the subject, the 
Maryland cases have eliminated a product user's reasonable care as an 
aspect of a section 402A claim. 
1. Babylon v. Scruton 
A Maryland case which predates the Restatement (Second) holds a 
manufacturer liable in negligence while applying key principles of sec-
tion 402A liability. In Babylon v. Scruton, 22 the superintendent of a 
product purchaser was permitted to pursue a claim against the manu-
facturer, though the plaintiff had no privity of contract with the defen-
dant.23 The manufacturer was held to "the skill of an expert in that 
business and to an expert's knowledge of the arts, materials, and 
... is not a defense when such negligence consists 'TJ'Iffrely in a failure to discover the 
defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND)§ 402A cmt. n. (emphasis added). The comment sim-
ply does not address the situations, like those seen in the Maryland cases 
discussed herein, where a plaintiff's fault is one of several causes of a harm 
and another cause of the harm is a defective product. See id. 
17. See id. § 402A cmts. a, d. 
18. Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 350-52, 363 A.2d 955, 962-63 
(1976); see also Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 436-38, 601 
A.2d 633, 641 (1992). 
19. Phipps, 278 Md. at 351-52, 363 A.2d at 962-63. 
20. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text. 
21. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. 
22. 215 Md. 299, 138 A.2d 375 (1958). 
23. !d. at 301-02, 138 A.2d at 376-77. 
2001] Plaintiffs' Fault in Products liability Cases 259 
processes."24 The manufacturer's negligence was determined by what 
"he knew or should have known."25 This precise rationale and lan-
guage, citing Babylon, has been used by the court of appeals subse-
quently to explain section 402A "strict liability."26 
2. Binakonsky v. Ford Motor Co. 
In Binakonsky v. Ford Motor Co.,27 the Fourth Circuit ruled that drunk 
driving is irrelevant to the recovery in a claim of uncrashworthiness.28 
When the district court originally heard this case, however, it ruled 
that the negligence of drunk driving defeated the plaintiff's negli-
gence and strict liability counts as a matter of law.29 The Fourth Cir-
cuit then reversed the summary judgment for Ford on the section 
402A claim, even though that count sought the same damages for the 
same alleged product defect caused by the same alleged fault of the 
manufacturer as in the negligence count.30 The functional difference 
between the two counts is limited entirely to the labels "negligence" 
and "strict liability."31 If a plaintiff has a "negligence" count and a 
"strict liability" count which seek the same damages for the same de-
fect caused by the same fault (and everything else is the same except 
the title of the count), the defenses to the two counts should be the 
same. In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia,32 the court of appeals stated 
that the difference for a product claim between negligence and strict 
24. /d. at 304, 138 A.2d at 378 (quoting 2 FoWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING jAMES, 
JR., THE LAw OF TORTS,§ 28.3 (1956)). 
25. Id. 
26. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 432-39, 601 A.2d 633, 638-41 
(1992). 
27. 133 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 1998). 
28. Id. at 288 (applying Maryland law). "Crashworthiness" is a term of art used 
in products liability law when "the manufacturer of a defective product can 
be held liable for injury or death resulting from a vehicle crash even 
though the defective crash did not cause the initial harm to the victim." 
Binakonsky v. Ford Motor Co., 929 F. Supp. 915, 920 (D. Md. 1996). 
29. Binakonsky, 929 F. Supp. at 920, 922. If the victim's injuries are exacerbated 
by the defective product, the manufacturer may be liable for the enhanced 
injuries beyond those caused by the initial accident. /d. 
30. Binakonsky, 133 F.3d at 288-90. 
31. See Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 435 n.7, 601 A.2d 633, 640 n.7 
(1992). There the court demonstrated the difference between a strict 
products liability and a negligence claim by distinguishing the defenses ad-
dressed in this Article. /d. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 
("Restatement (Third)") would do away with the false distinction between 
strict liability and negligence products liability claims. "Two or more factu-
ally identical defective-design claims or two or more factually identical fail-
ure-to-warn claims should not be submitted to the trier of fact in the same 
case under different doctrinal labels." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. n; see 
also J. Henderson & A. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The 
Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265 (1990). 
32. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992) 
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liability is the availability of the contributory negligence defense.33 
The distinction is backwards. The claims should not be different be-
cause the courts say the defenses are different. The defenses should 
be different if the claims are distinct. Thus, the Restatement (Third) 
would eliminate both the meaningless distinctions between "negli-
gence," "strict liability," and "implied warranty,"34 and it would pro-
vide the same defenses to all products liability claims.35 
3. Sheehan v. Anthony Pools 
In Sheehan v. Anthony Pools,36 one of the only cases factually consid-
ering the plaintiffs fault in a section 402A claim, the court of special 
appeals and the court of appeals appropriately referred to the text of 
comment n.37 The plaintiffs in Sheehan alleged failure to warn be-
cause there was no notice to product users that the non-skid surface 
on the diving board did not extend to its side edges. 38 The defense 
argued that the plaintiff's inattention caused him to slip off the side of 
the board. 39 Because the plaintiffs claimed that a proper board would 
have prevented the fall,40 the significance of this plaintiff's conduct 
was whether the fall would have occurred even if the board were prop-
erly designedY 
This instance appears to fall into the species of failure to detect the 
defect to which comment n directly speaks. When faced with this situ-
ation, the courts noted without elaboration that the "ordinary" con-
tributory negligence of failing to notice the defect is not a defense to 
the section 402A claim.42 
C. Maryland Dicta 
While no subsequent state court decision has directly considered 
the significance of a plaintiffs fault in a section 402A claim, several 
opinions touch on the subject with dicta. 
33. Id. at 435 n.7, 601 A.2d at 640 n.7; see also supra note 31 and accompanying 
text. 
34. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. n. 
35. Id. § 17. 
36. 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983). 
37. Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 623-26, 440 A.2d 1085, 1090-
92 (1982), affd 295 Md. 285, 299, 455 A.2d 434, 441 (1983). 
38. Sheehan, 50 Md. App. at 621, 440 A.2d at 1089. 
39. See id. at 617, 440 A.2d at 1087. This inference is drawn from the court's 
rejection of the appellee's requested jury instruction that contributory neg-
ligence was a defense before the case went to the jury on the strict liability 
count. Id. 
40. Id. at 616-17, 440 A.2d at 1087. 
41. See id. at 622-23, 440 A.2d at 1090 (describing plaintiff's alleged improper 
use of the board). 
42. Id. at 626, 440 A.2d at 1092 (citing Luque v. McLean, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169 
(Cal. 1972)). 
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1. Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie 
In Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie,43 the plaintiff was burned while wear-
ing a bathrobe.44 The robe was worn inside out, which exposed a 
pocket to the burner of a stove.45 When the pocket touched the heat, 
the robe caught fire and burned the plaintiff.46 The question for the 
court of appeals was whether the jury should have been instructed 
that there was no contributory negligence defense available.47 The 
court held that any fault by the plaintiff was not a defense to the sec-
tion 402A claim.48 Despite the absence of a factual context necessary 
to induce a change in the law, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
dicta omitted the word "ordinary" in stating that contributory negli-
gence is not a defense to a section 402A claim.49 
With no party claiming that the plaintiff was at fault, 50 Ellsworth is 
another weak vehicle for delineating the effect of true causal fault on 
a products liability case. Nothing in the facts or posture of the case 
indicates a conscious intent to amend the rule stated in Sheehan and 
the Restatement (Second). Ellsworth, however, does provide the authority 
that contributory negligence is never a defense to a section 402A 
claim.51 
2. Valk Manufacturing Co. v. Rangaswamy 
In the subsequent case of Valk Manufacturing Co. v. Rangaswamy,52 
Rangaswamy suffered fatal injuries in an automobile accident with a 
Montgomery County truck carrying a snowplow hitch made by Valk.53 
The defendant argued that contributory negligence amounted to the 
knowing and unreasonable assumption of the risk of a product defect 
that is a defense to a strict products liability claim.54 The trial court 
found the decedent contributorily negligent as a matter of law, pre-
43. 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348 (1985). 
44. !d. at 587, 495 A.2d at 351. 
45. !d. 
46. !d. at 588, 495 A.2d at 351. 
47. !d. at 598-600, 495 A.2d at 356-57. 
48. !d. at 598, 495 A.2d at 357 (holding that "contributory negligence is not a 
defense in an action of strict liability in tort"); see also supra notes 6-9, 31 
and accompanying text. 
49. Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 598, 495 A.2d at 356 (noting that the plaintiff's fault 
was not even the subject of the appeal). 
50. !d. at 588, 495 A.2d at 351. 
51. See id. at 598, 495 A.2d at 356. For cases citing this aspect of Ellsworth, see 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 435 n.7, 601 A.2d 633, 640 n.7 
(1992); Montgomery County v. Valk Mfg. Co., 317 Md. 185, 188, 562 A.2d 
1246, 1247 (1989); Mazda Motor of Am., Inc. v. Rogowski, 105 Md. App. 318, 
326, 659 A.2d 391, 395 (1995). 
52. 74 Md. App. 304, 537 A.2d 622 (1987). 
53. !d. at 307, 537 A.2d at 622, 624. 
54. !d. at 324, 537 A.2d at 632. 
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eluding recovery on the negligence count.55 In analyzing the prod-
ucts liability count, however, the court determined that the plaintiff 
"was not remotely aware" that a defectively designed product "was 
about to aggravate the imminent collision" between plaintiff and the 
county vehicle. 5 6 Therefore, since the plaintiff was not aware of the 
defect in the hitch, the plaintiff did not, as a matter of law, assume the 
risk of the product defect.57 
The Valk Manufacturing court was asked to hold that plaintiff's negli-
gent driving could at least be considered by the jury to be assumption 
of the risk that a high-mounted snowplow hitch might come through 
his car window.58 The court noted the absence of knowing and unrea-
sonable assumption of the defect in an unseen snowplow hitch.59 Per-
haps because of the way in which the issue was presented, the decision 
does not address the policy issue of whether the driver's fault, but for 
which the harm would not have occurred, should be legally irrelevant 
in determining the plaintiff's recovery. 
While the Valk Manufacturing court was not asked to consider de-
claring the plaintiff's fault irrelevant for the section 402A count, the 
case presents facts that raise the policy issue. 60 If the decedent had 
not put his car in a position to be "battered" by the high-mount snow-
plow hitch, the hitch would not have hurt him. He drove without due 
care as a matter of law.61 The "ordinary" contributory negligence re-
ferred to in comment n is inapplicable because the decedent's poor 
driving was not a matter of failing to guard against a product defect he 
had no reason to expect.62 Instead, the negligent driving was unrea-
sonable conduct that had foreseeable results, including severe injury 
or death, even though the precise means of the harm were not antici-
pated. While his contributory negligence resulted in a judgment for 
the defense on the negligence count,63 the plaintiff still recovered full 
damages under section 402A by also pleading strict liability, as con-
tributory negligence is not a defense to strict liability under Maryland 
law.64 
III. TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFFS' AND DEFENDANTS' FORE-
SEEABILI1Y OF HARM 
The treatment of defendants' and plaintiffs' fault in Maryland prod-
ucts liability cases is inconsistent. Courts broadly apply the concept of 
55. Id. at 308, 537 A.2d at 624. 
56. Id. at 325, 537 A.2d at 632. 
57. Id. 
58. ld. at 324-25, 537 A.2d at 632-33. 
59. ld. at 325, 537 A.2d at 632. 
60. See id. at 307-08, 537 A.2d at 623-24. 
61. ld. at 308, 537 A.2d at 624. 
62. See id. at 324-25, 537 A.2d at 632. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 325, 537 A.2d at 633; see also supra note 1. 
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foreseeability when analyzing the defendants' fault-fault-based liabil-
ity extends to all foreseeable harms caused by the fault. 65 According 
to the court of appeals, "[u]nder this analysis the unusual and bizarre 
details of accidents, which human experience shows are far from un-
likely, are only significant as background facts to the individual case; it 
is not necessary that the manufacturer foresee the exact manner in 
which accidents occur."66 
In contrast, plaintiffs' relevant fault in a Maryland products liability 
case is purportedly limited to unreasonably assuming a risk of the 
product known personally to the plaintiff. The "subjective" elements 
of the assumption of the risk defense as the Maryland courts construe 
comment n to section 402A are, "1) the plaintiff actually knew and 
appreciated the particular risk or danger created by the defect; 2) the 
plaintiff voluntarily encountered the risk while realizing the danger; 
and 3) the plaintiff's decision to encounter the known risk was unrea-
sonable."67 As we have seen, the asymmetry in the treatment of the 
plaintiffs' and defendants' fault was not intended by the Restatement 
(Second) and has not survived in the Restatement (Third). 68 
The result of the asymmetry is that product sellers are required to 
compensate plaintiffs who were injured only because their own fault 
placed them in harm's way. For instance, a plaintiff can reasonably 
foresee the perils, including death, of driving into the path of a dump 
truck. The Maryland courts hold, however, that when a product such 
as a defective plow hitch is appended to the truck, the plaintiff's con-
tributory fault becomes irrelevant, even though the risk of harm posed 
by the plow hitch only exists for people in the path of the dump 
truck.69 
A product seller must anticipate, and mitigate to the extent possi-
ble, the risk that the product will be involved in accidents.7° For in-
stance, cars must be reasonably crashworthy even though they are not 
intended to be crashed; 71 nightgowns must resist catching fire even 
65. See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Sheme Lingerie, 303 Md. 581, 598, 495 A.2d 348, 357-
58 (1985) (wearing of a bathrobe inside-out, which resulted in the robe 
catching fire over a kitchen stove, was foreseeable to the product sellers and 
as a matter oflawwas not product misuse); Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 
538, 553, 332 A.2d 11, 20 (1975) (pouring perfume on a lighted candle to 
"scent" the candle was foreseeable to the seller). 
66. Moran, 273 Md. at 553, 332 A.2d at 20. 
67. Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 597, 495 A.2d at 356 (quoting Sheehan v. Anthony 
Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 626 n.ll, 440 A.2d 1085, 1092 n.ll (1982)). 
68. See supra Part II.A. 
69. See supra Part II.C.2 for a discussion of Valk Mfg. Co. v. Rangaswamy. 
70. Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 215-16, 321 A.2d 737, 745 
(1974) (answering the certified question oflaw and stating that an automo-
bile must be crashworthy). 
71. See, e.g., Binakonsky v. Ford Motor Corp., 929 F. Supp. 915, 920 (D. Md. 
1996); Volkswagen, 272 Md. at 217, 321 A.2d at 7 45-46. 
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when worn inside out; 72 and a warning must be given that perfume is 
flammable even though it is not intended to be used near open 
flames. 73 In both Binakonsky and Valk Manufacturing, the alleged de-
fects might have caused the death of persons other than the plaintiff 
through no fault of the person harmed. 74 That does not mean, how-
ever, that the plaintiff at fault should be compensated as if there were 
no fault. 
If the product seller can foresee some accidents occurring beyond 
the seller's control, some of those accidents will be foreseeable to the 
product user as well. For instance, a drunk driver ought to foresee the 
risk of a crash, and the seller should foresee the consequences of a 
crash not caused by its product. 75 
The reason an accident was caused should not always be irrelevant 
when determining the defendants' liability in a products liability 
claim. The Fifth Circuit has held that a drunk driver driving at high 
speeds and causing tire failure was relevant to a claim that the tires 
were faulty. 76 North Dakota has also addressed a driver's fault in a 
crash worthiness claim when a sleeping driver wrecked. 77 
The Illinois Supreme Court holds plaintiffs accountable for their 
own contributory fault in a products liability action, yet does not un-
dermine the principle of holding sellers liable for the harm caused by 
their fault; there is "no reason to spread the cost of the loss resulting 
from the plaintiff's own fault to the consuming public."78 
Maryland's differential treatment of both plaintiffs' and defendants' 
fault in products liability cases results from neither articulated reason-
ing nor from application of persuasive analogies. This shortcoming 
springs entirely from a three-sentence comment to section 402A in-
tended to absolve product users from inspecting for unexpected de-
fects.79 Treating plaintiffs' fault more gently than defendants' is not 
good policy because plaintiffs' fault is not inherently "better" than de-
fendants.80 The Restatement (Third), which replaces comment n to sec-
tion 402A with a complete, coherent section based on the 
contributory negligence rule,81 provides a better treatment of plain-
tiffs' fault in products liability cases. 
72. Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 598, 495 A.2d at 357. 
73. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 553, 332 A.2d 11, 20 (1975). 
74. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of Binakonsky v. Ford Motor Co. See 
supra Part II.C.2 for a discussion of Valk Mfg. Co. v. Rangaswamy. 
75. See generally supra Part I. 
76. Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 290 (5th Cir. 1975) (apply-
ing Mississippi law). 
77. Day v. Gen. Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349, 357 (N.D. 1984). 
78. Coney v.J.L.G. Indus., 454 N.E.2d 197, 202 (Ill. 1983). 
79. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. n. 
80. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 17; see also supra notes 76-78. 
81. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 17. 
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IV. THREE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO PLAINTIFFS' 
FAULT 
A. Knowing and Unreasonable Use 
Presently, Maryland law limits a successful defendant's argument to 
a knowing and unreasonable use of a dangerous and defective prod-
uct by the plaintiff.82 Essentially, this approach elevates the pleading 
of products liability theories as either "negligence" or "strict liability" 
above either the facts of the case or the policies behind fault-based 
liability. The difference caused by pleading in one way or another is 
the defenses permitted,83 rather than having different defenses be-
cause there is a substantive difference in the theories. Maryland's ap-
proach to plaintiffs' fault in a products liability case is inconsistent 
with Maryland's general contributory negligence bar to recovery,84 
and is inconsistent with the approach of the majority of states, which 
treat plaintiffs' fault as relevant in a products liability case.85 
B. Contributory Negligence 
One alternative to the current state of Maryland law is to expand 
the types of plaintiffs' fault that form a complete defense to a products 
liability claim. Maryland already recognizes that its assumption of the 
risk defense is closely related to contributory negligence.86 The con-
tributory negligence defense could be included without overruling 
any Maryland decision. The new rule could state that a product user 
has no obligation to inspect a product for unanticipated safety defects, 
and a failure to inspect for such defects would not constitute a lack of 
due care.87 The revised statement of the rule would be that a person 
has the same obligation of due care with regard to products, whether 
that person is a product user or a product seller.88 In a products lia-
82. 
83. 
84. 
85. 
86. 
87. 
88. 
See supra Part II. 
See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. 
See Montgomery County v. Valk Mfg. Co., 317 Md. 185, 188, 562 A.2d 1246, 
1247 (1989) (stating that in Maryland, contributory negligence bars direct 
negligence claims but not claims of strict liability). 
See, e.g., Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983). 
Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, 303 Md. 581, 598, 495 A.2d 348, 356 (1985). 
The court stated: 
[C]ontributory negligence is not a defense in an action of strict 
liability in tort. Conduct which aperates to defeat recovery may in fact be 
negligent, but confusion will be avoided if it is remembered that a 
plaintiff is barred only because such conduct constitutes misuse or 
assumption of risk, and not because it constitutes contributory 
negligence. 
!d. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
See Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 626 n.ll, 440 A.2d 1085, 
1092 n.ll (1982), affd 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983). This is precisely 
the approach adopted by Illinois. Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., 454 N.E.2d 197, 
203-04 (Ill. 1983). 
See supra note 3. 
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bility action, if the plaintiffs' failure to use due care was a proximate 
cause of the harm complained of, then the result would be the same 
as in any negligence claim asserting a defendant's liability for lack of 
due care. The contributory negligence defense, however, contradicts 
the dicta in Maryland case law that user fault is irrelevant in a strict 
products liability claim.89 
C. Comparative Fault 
The third alternative approach to plaintiffs' fault in a products lia-
bility action is adoption of comparative fault for products liability 
claims.9° Comparative fault reduces plaintiffs' recovery based on the 
amount of fault a plaintiff contributes to the harm suffered.91 This 
approach has the virtue of not conflicting with the language of Ells-
worth92 and Valk Manufacturinf3 that plaintiffs' fault will not com-
pletely bar recovery in a products liability action. This approach 
would also be consistent with the majority of states that apply the rule 
from the current Restatement.94 ' 
Conversely, a rule of comparative fault for products liability cases in 
Maryland would be inconsistent with the rule of contributory negli-
gence for other kinds of negligence cases.95 Reducing plaintiffs' re-
covery because of plaintiffs' fault, however, makes more sense than 
"compensating" plaintiff for that fault.96 Therefore, such a partial so-
lution is better than none at all. Currently, Maryland's contributory 
negligence rule is completely at odds with the treatment of plaintiffs' 
fault in products liability cases.97 
A court should not require a manufacturer to pay unreduced dam-
ages to a plaintiff who is at fault. Consequently, a majority of states 
reduce plaintiffs' recovery for a products liability claim caused in part 
89. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
90. See Kampen v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157 F.3d 306, 324 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(discussing Louisiana's adoption of comparative fault by statute when ap-
plied to products liability and by common law for ordinary tort situations). 
91. Section 17 states a rule of comparative fault. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 17. 
Distinguishing between and arguing about various iterations of compara-
tive fault is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of different 
types of comparative fault regimes see Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of 
Educ., 295 Md. 442, 447-48, 453-55, 456 A.2d 894, 896-97, 899-901 (1983); 
see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 17 cmt. b. 
92. See supra Part II.C.l. 
93. See supra Part II.C.2. 
94. Section 17 of the Restatement (Third) states that the majority rule for the 
American states is comparative fault in products liability suits. REsTATE-
MENT (THIRD) § 17. 
95. See Harrison, 295 Md. at 442, 456 A.2d at 894. Whether comparative fault or 
contributory negligence represents better policy generally for treating 
plaintiffs' fault is beyond the scope of this Article. 
96. See Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., 454 N.E.2d 197, 202 (Ill. 1983). 
97. See supra Part II.B-C. 
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by plaintiffs' fault.98 While Maryland has not adopted this rule, sec-
tion 17 of the Restatement (Third) provides: "[a] plaintiff's recovery of 
damages for harm caused by a product defect may be reduced if the 
conduct of the plaintiff combines with the product defect to cause the 
harm and the plaintiff's conduct fails to conform to generally applica-
ble rules establishing appropriate standards of care."99 
One justification for section 17 is the fact that comparative fault for 
negligence has replaced contributory negligence as the majority rule 
since the adoption of the Restatement (Second). 100 In fact, the ALI finds 
that a "strong majority of jurisdictions apply the comparative responsi-
bility doctrine to products liability actions."101 Application of this doc-
trine broadens the relevance of plaintiffs' fault beyond an 
unreasonable assumption of the risk of the product's defect. 102 
The Restatement (Third)'s approach considers "all forms of plaintiff's 
failure to conform to applicable standards of care" for apportioning 
responsibility between the plaintiff and defendant.103 This approach 
declines to separate plaintiffs' fault into discrete categories like as-
sumption of the risk, "ordinary" inattention to product design fail-
ures, or use of a product while impaired.104 Section 17 states that 
"[r]ecognition of such special categories tends to result in either a 
plaintiff being absolved from responsibility or being completely 
barred from recovery."105 Such recognition results in litigation at-
tempting to pigeonhole conduct rather than acknowledging the true 
significance of all of the facts. As a result, "[t]hat effort has proven 
costly and largely futile." 106 In determining the "appropriate percent-
ages of responsibility between the plaintiff and the [defendant]," the 
98. See Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 43 
(Alaska 1976) (holding for the first time that comparative negligence ap-
plies to products liability);Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 904 P.2d 861, 
866 (Ariz. 1995) (applying statutory comparative fault principles to strict 
products liability); Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1169 (Cal. 
1978) (stating that the adoption of comparative negligence will not result 
in large impairment of safety incentives); Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 
166, 171 (La. 1985) (rejecting contributory negligence and adopting com-
parative fault in a products liability case); Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 
1085 (Utah 1998) (applying statutory comparative fault). 
99. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 17 (a). 
100. See id. § 17 cmt. a. 
101. !d. The comparative fault doctrine reduces plaintiffs' recovery in propor-
tion to plaintiffs' fault, with variations among the states that apply compara-
tive fault. !d. § 17 cmt. b. Maryland has not applied comparative fault to 
negligence claims. See Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 
Md. 442, 447-48, 453-55, 456 A.2d 894, 896-97, 899-901 (1983). 
102. REsTATEMENT (THIRD)§ 17(a). 
103. !d. § 17 cmt. d. 
104. !d. 
105. !d.§ 17 cmt. d. (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994). 
106. !d. 
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severity of the plaintiffs' fault as well as the nature of the product de-
fect are relevant. 107 
Courts employing comparative fault in strict products liability cases 
emphasize that it is both unfair and economically inefficient for the 
plaintiffs' fault to be compensated and spread to other consumers. 
For instance, in Coney v.JL.G. Industries, Inc., 108 the Supreme Court of 
Illinois decided that comparative fault does not reduce the incentive 
to sell safe products. 109 The cost of product defects continues to be 
borne by the sellers and is accordingly spread among consumers. 110 
The court in Coney also stated that " [ o] nly that portion [of the cost of 
injuries] due to plaintiff's own conduct or fault is borne by the plain-
tiff."111 The court saw no rea.Son to spread the loss resulting from 
plaintiffs' fault to other consumers. 112 The Third Circuit has joined 
in the criticism of "compensating" plaintiffs for harm they have caused 
themselves, which results in the defendant "paying for a part of the 
loss which is attributable not to the product defect, but to plaintiff's 
conduct."113 
In the Restatement (Third), the ALI has abandoned any non-fault dis-
tinctions between negligence and strict liability and settled upon a sin-
gle body of law for products liability.U 4 While Maryland has not 
107. 
108. 
109. 
110. 
111. 
112. 
113. 
114. 
/d. 
454 N.E.2d 197 (Ill. 1983). 
/d. at 202. 
/d. 
/d.; see also Whitehead v. Toyota Motor Corp., 897 S.W.2d 684, 693 (Tenn. 
1995); Coney, 454 N.E.2d at 203. Coney stated that the apportionment be-
tween plaintiffs' and defendants' fault is a matter of '"asking how much was 
caused by the plaintiff's own actions."' /d. at 203 (quoting Murray v. Fair-
banks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 159 (3d Cir. 1979)); see also Busch v. Busch 
Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 394 (Minn. 1977). The North Dakota Su-
preme Court has stated that, "the ultimate objective of comparing negli-
gence in a products liability case is to apportion, on a percentage basis, all 
causes of the mishap resulting in damages." Day v. Gen. Motors Corp., 345 
N.W.2d 349, 354 (N.D. 1984). 
Coney, 454 N.E.2d at 197. 
Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 141, 161 (3d Cir. 1979). 
See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 cmt. n. Maryland should adopt section 2 of 
the Restatement (Third). The only meaningful distinction between negli-
gence and strict liability products claims in Maryland is the effect of plain-
tiffs fault. See, e.g., Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 435 n.7, 
601 A.2d 633, 640 n.7 (1992) ("[S]trict liability differs from a negligence 
cause of action in that contributory negligence is not a defense to a strict 
liability claim.") (citation omitted). This distinction stems from the incipi-
ent nature of section 402A, when the Restatement (Second) was written, as 
opposed to thirty-five years of national legal development since then. Be-
cause the distinguishing effect of plaintiffs' fault is unsound and incoher-
ent, there is no reason Maryland should try to distinguish indistinct legal 
doctrines. There are at least two untoward effects of maintaining two 
names for defendants' fault in a products liability case. One is the tempta-
tion for juries and judges to find that distinctions must inhere in the two 
names for fault, rather than addressing the facts and obligations in any 
given case. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 84 Md. App. 10, 35, 
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addressed this development by the ALI, the development is consistent 
with Maryland's decisions following section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second). 115 
1. Adoption of Comparative Fault by Other Jurisdictions 
The Reporters' Note to Restatement (Third) section 17, comment a, 
provides a compendium of judicial decisions and statutes adopting 
comparative fault for products liability cases.U 6 This authority indi-
cates that approximately seventeen states, including Tennessee, have 
judicially adopted comparative fault as a reduction of strict products 
liability damages. 117 Puerto Rico also applies comparative fault in 
strict products liability casesY8 Furthermore, twelve states, including 
several not included in the Reporters' Note, have enacted compara-
tive fault statutes that reduce strict products liability damages.U9 
Nonetheless, a small minority of states continue to define strictly the 
defenses that completely bar or reduce a section 402A claim and re-
ject any other fault as a basis for affecting the damages recoverable for 
578 A.2d 228, 240 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 326 Md. 179, 604 A.2d 445 
(1992) ("Appellants ... argue that they could not consistently have been 
found to have acted negligently with respect to the use of products which 
the jury also concluded were not unreasonably dangerous in the absence of 
any warning."). 
115. See, e.g., ACandS, Inc. v. Asner, 344 Md. 155, 168, 686 A.2d 250, 256 (1996) 
("'[I] n a failure to warn case governed by the Restatement § 402A and 
Comment j, negligence concepts to some extent have been grafted onto 
strict liability.'") (quoting Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 435, 
601 A.2d 633,640 (1992)); Klein v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 92 Md. App. 477, 
492, 608 A.2d 1276, 1284 (1992) ("Maryland's view of strict liability in tort 
for injuries caused by a dangerous and defective product is that such tort is 
akin to negligence."); Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 74 Md. App. 613, 
619, 539 A.2d 701, 704 (1988) ("To recover under the authority of§ 402A, 
a plaintiff need not prove any specific act of negligence on the part of the 
seller, but the plaintiff must prove that the product was in a defective condi-
tion and unreasonably dangerous at the time the product was sold.") (foot-
note omitted) (emphasis in original). 
116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 17 rptr. n., cmt. a. 
117. See Whitehead v. Toyota Motor Corp., 897 S.W.2d 684, 693 (Tenn. 1995) 
("In keeping with the principle of linking liability with fault, a plaintiff's 
ability to recover in a strict products liability case should not be unaffected 
by the extent to which his injuries result from his own fault."). 
118. See McPhail v. Municipality of Culebra, 598 F.2d 603,. 606 (1st Cir. 1979) 
("Puerto Rico has adopted the rule announced in Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp. 
that an injured victim's assumption of risk or contributory negligence will 
not bar but will only reduce recovery in a strict liability case.") (citations 
omitted) (footnotes omitted); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1991) ("Con-
current imprudence of the party aggrieved does not exempt from liability, 
but entails a reduction of the indemnity."). 
119. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 12-2505 (West 1984); IowA CoDE ANN.§§ 668.1, 
668.3 (West 1998); KY. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 411.182 (Michie 1988); ME. REv. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (West 2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.765 (West 
2000); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719 (1997). 
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that claim.120 A reading of cases from those statutes, however, shows 
an approach to strict products liability that diverges from Maryland's 
fault-based application of section 402A.121 
2. Maryland's Authority to Adopt Comparative Fault 
Maryland courts have the authority to adopt comparative fault for 
section 402A claims. The court of appeals, in Phipps v. General Motors 
Corp., 122 the seminal section 402A case, rejected the claim that only 
the General Assembly could determine the law in this field. 123 The 
sole fact that decisions prior to Phipps had not adopted strict liability 
did not constitute a rejection of the concept.124 Likewise, prior deci-
sions not considering comparative fault in relation to a section 402A 
claim should not constitute a rejection of that concept. Several courts 
have excluded failure to inspect from plaintiffs' fault relevant to sec-
tion 402A liability, while comparing all other fault in determining the 
defendant's liability.125 Thus, comparative fault could be adopted 
without overruling prior Maryland case law.126 
V. CONCLUSION 
Fault-based products liability is inconsistent with a constriction of 
defenses so tight that truly faulty behavior, which is a substantial con-
tributing cause of harm, does not affect plaintiffs' recovery at all. The 
policy of not requiring consumer inspections for defects is a far cry 
from holding that plaintiffs' causal fault has no bearing at all on the 
liability of the defendant unless it is a knowing and unreasonable as-
sumption of risk of the product defect. 127 Meaningful fault on the 
120. See supra note 119. 
121. See supra note 119; see also Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 346, 
363 A.2d 955, 960 (1976). 
122. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976). 
123. /d. at 350, 363 A.2d at 962. 
124. See id. at 346-48, 363 A.2d at 960-61. 
125. See, e.g., Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854, 862-63 
(W. Va. 1982) ("We note, however, that the Restatement, (Second), Tarts spe-
cifically states that a plaintiff's failure to discover a defect or to guard 
against it should not be considered contributory negligence .... We adopt 
this rule .... "); Busch v. Busch Constr. Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 394 n.16 
(Minn. 1977) ("Thus we adopt Restatement, Torts 2d, § 402A, comment n, 
only insofar as it removes the failure to inspect a product as a defense. In 
all other cases, plaintiff is not absolutely barred from recovery, but compar-
ative fault concepts will apply."); see also Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 
F.2d 149, 161 (3d Cir. 1979) ("The recognition of contributory fault as an 
absolute bar to recovery would improperly shift the total loss to the plain-
tiff. Under a system of comparative fault, however, there are good reasons 
for allowing some form of contributory fault to be considered in reducing 
damages."). 
126. See supra Part II.B. 
127. See supra Part II.A. 
2001] Plaintiffs' Fault in Products Liability Cases 271 
part of a plaintiff should affect any recovery in litigation, without re-
gard to doctrines sprouting from. the infancy of modern products lia-
bility law and its focus on manufacturing defects. 128 
128. See supra Part II.A. 
